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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
Qwest Communications Company, LLC ("Qwest") filed this appeal from the District

Court's erroneous entry of judgment on the merits

in which the trial court voided contracts that

had been performed for five years - without hearing any evidence on the claim in question. The
District Court's decision is incorrect in many ways, but most fundamentally the court erred in its
conclusion that this Court's holding that Syringa Networks, LLC ("Syringa") had standing to
pursue a claim challenging contract amendments was a determination on the merits of Syringa's
claim. This holding deprived Qwest and the other Defendants of any opportunity to develop a
factual record and defend against Syringa's allegations on the merits.
Moreover, although this Court determined that Syringa had standing to pursue its claim
challenging the contract amendments, the District Court should have determined that the claim
was barred by other principles of law and dismissed it. Among other things, Syringa had long
disavowed any claim challenging the original contract awards to Qwest and Education Networks
of America ("ENA"), and the District Court should not have allowed it to change course five
years into the lawsuit. Moreover, the District Court erred by exceeding its jurisdiction, failing to
allow the original contracts to continue in effect notwithstanding any infirmities in the
amendments, allowing Syringa to challenge contracts from which it received substantial benefits,
and voiding the entirety of the contracts due to a perceived infirmity in just a portion of them.
The judgment below should be reversed.
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B.

Course of Proceedings Below.
1.

Prior to First Appeal.
a)

The Idaho Education Network and State Agency Contract.

In 2008, the Idaho Legislature established the Idaho Education Network ("IEN"), which
was intended to be "a high-bandwidth telecommunications distribution system for distance
learning in every public school in Idaho." (R., p. 1114 (Affidavit of Greg Zickau 17; R., p. 1639
(Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Pending Dispositive Motions).) Consistent with its
intended purpose, the IEN provided Idaho students with "increased educational opportunities ...
including students in Idaho's most rural districts who [could have] access to the same
opportunities as students in Idaho's most urban districts." (Id.)
The DOA was given administrative oversight of the IEN, including procuring
telecommunication services and equipment for the IEN through an open and competitive bidding
process. Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dept. ofAdmin. ("Syringa I"), 305 P.3d 499, 502
(Idaho 2013) (citing LC.§ 67-5745D(5)(h). The DOA issued a Request for Proposals ("RFP") in
December 2008 for two distinct projects: (i) implementation of the IEN, and (ii) state agency
network services. Id. at 502. ENA, Qwest, and Verizon Business Network Services, Inc. each
submitted responsive proposals. Id. Syringa did not bid, but instead entered into a teaming
agreement in support of EN A's response to the DOA's RFP. See Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 508.
On January 28, 2009, the DOA selected ENA and Qwest to provide services for the IEN
and state agency network services. (See R., p. 1639 (Memorandum Decision and Order Re:
Pending Dispositive Motions).) This decision was memorialized by issuing two "essentially
identical Statewide Blanket Purchase Orders ("SBPO"); SBPO 1308 to Qwest, and SBPO 1309
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to ENA." (Id.) SBPO 1308 and SBPO 1309 ("original SBPOs") "contained the same scope of
work, to perform the entire scope of the RFP requirements." (Id.) LC.§ 67-5718A permits
multiple awards for "same or similar" services.
"Where a contract for property has been awarded to two (2) or more bidders in
accordance with this section, a state agency shall make purchases from the contractor whose
terms and conditions regarding price, availability, support services and delivery are most
advantageous to the agency." LC.§ 67-5718A(3). The DOA therefore "issued separate
statements in order to clarify the State's intended roles and responsibilities of the multiple award
contractors for the implementation of the high schools phase of the IEN." (R., p. 1122 (Affidavit
of Greg Zickau ,i 37).) These statements were labeled "Amendment No. l" with respect to
SBPO 1308 and SBPO 1309, and were designed to identify the DOA's determination as to how
ENA's and Qwest's services would be used with respect to the network services component of
the IEN. (R., p. I 122-26 (Affidavit of Greg Zickau ,i 38-55).) Qwest and ENA did not approve
or sign the amendments; the District Court concluded, and this Court agreed, that the DOA
issued them unilaterally. Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 509-10.
By their express terms, the Amendments No. 1 pertained to the technical network
services aspect of the procurement as it related solely to the IEN. As a result, school districts and
state agencies 1 purchased various services under the Original SBPOs from ENA and Qwest
without regard to the Amendments No. 1. (See R., p. 1124 (Affidavit of Greg Zickau ,i 41-46);

"The agencies include: Health and Welfare, Labor; Liquor Dispensary; Vocational
Rehabilitation; Tax Commission; Juvenile Corrections; Fish and Game; Corrections; Health
District I-III, V and VII; Environmental Quality; Water Resources; Building Safety; PERSI;
Insurance; Parks and Recreation; Veteran's Services and the Idaho Supreme Court." (R., p. 1117
(Affidavit of Greg Zickau ,i 15).)
DEFENDANT/ APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENT QWEST COMMUNICATIONS LLC'S
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R., pp. 1191-94 (Affidavit of Bob Collie ,i 12-13 ). )
Finally, Syringa entered into a Master Service Agreement with Qwest for the express and
sole purpose of providing services for the IEN. (See R., pp. 1318-20 (Affidavit of Elissa
Homenock ,i 2-8).) Under this agreement, Syringa received $1,438,367 from 2011 through 2013
for !EN-related services. (R., p. 1319 (Affidavit of Elissa Homenock ,i 7).)

b)

Syringa's Original Claims.

Syringa brought this case through a six-count Complaint alleging: (I) breach of contract
against the DOA (Count 1); (2) violation of I.C. § 67-5726 by the DOA (Count 2, seeking
declaratory relief); (3) violation ofl.C. §§ 67-5718A and 67-5718 by the DOA (Count 3, seeking
declaratory relief); (4) tortious interference with Contract against the DOA, department officers

J. Michael Gwartney and Jack G. Zickau, and Qwest (Count 4); (5) tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage against Qwest (Count 5); and (6) breach of contract against
Education Networks of America, Inc. ("ENA") (Count 6). Syringa initially was not successful
before the District Court. See Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 503.
With respect to the breach of contract claim against the DOA, the District Court
determined that Syringa failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the DOA
accepted the teaming agreement between ENA and Syringa. The court rejected Counts Two and
Three alleging violations ofldaho competitive bidding laws - without any consideration of the

merits

because Syringa had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. As to the

remaining claims, the court held that there was no enforceable contract between ENA and
Syringa, and no evidence oftortious interference by Qwest. Accordingly, all of Syringa's claims
were dismissed. See Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 503-10.
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2.

First Appeal.

On Syringa's first appeal to this Court, Syringa conceded that it "does not challenge the
Letter of Intent or the identical and lawful SBPOs issued to Qwest and ENA on January 28, 2009
because they did not split the IEN Project." (See R., p. 1401.) As to Syringa's claims for
declaratory relief alleging violations ofldaho procurement law (Counts Two and Three), Syringa
asserted that the District Court erred in holding that Syringa was barred from challenging the
legality of the post-award amendments to the Statewide Blanket Purchase Orders by failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. By cross-appeal, the DOA argued that Syringa lacked standing
to challenge the DOA's actions as alternative grounds for affirmance.
This Court addressed these limited issues. First, this Court concluded that Syringa had
"alleged a distinct and palpable injury, not suffered by all Idaho citizens, that is alleged to have
been caused by the challenged conduct and that can be redressed by judicial relief' and therefore
had standing to challenge the amended contract. Syringa I, 305 P.2d at 505-06. Second, this
Court held that the District Court erred in dismissing Count Three of Syringa's complaint on the
ground Syringa failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, because Syringa did not have any
statutory remedies to exhaust. Id. at 506.
As to the breach of contract claims against ENA, this Court held that "[b ]ecause the
parties did not agree upon price, which was a material term of the contract, the teaming
agreement was not an enforceable contract." Id. at 510. Turning to the tortious interference with
contract claim against Qwest, Gwartney, and Zickau, this Court held that "[b]ecause the teaming
agreement was not an enforceable contract, these parties could not have committed the tort of
interfering with the alleged contract." Id. at 508. Finally, this Court affirmed the District
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Court's holding that "the record showed that the decision on how to divide the work between
Qwest and ENA was a unilateral decision by the Department of Administration." Id. at 509-10.
As a result, the District Court did not err in dismissing Syringa's tortious interference with
prospective advantage claim against Qwest. Id.
As a result of this Court's opinion in Syringa I, the only claim remaining from Syringa's
Complaint was Count Three against the DOA. Id. at 512. This Court therefore remanded Count
Three of the Complaint - and that Count alone

for further proceedings consistent with the

opinion "dismissing all counts of the complaint except count three seeking to set aside the State's
contract with Qwest on the ground that it was awarded in violation of the applicable statutes."
Id. Because all claims against ENA and Qwest had been dismissed and this dismissal was
affirmed on appeal, ENA and Qwest were made non-parties.
3.

Post-Appeal.

Prior to remand, Syringa had never challenged the original awards, and expressly limited
its claims to challenging the Amendments No. I that delegated a portion of the work related to
the IEN. On remand, the District Court initially allowed Syringa to restructure its case and
extend Count Three to challenge the original award. (R., p. 59.) On reconsideration, however,
the District Court concluded that Syringa could not amend its Complaint to challenge the January
28, 2009 IEN Purchase Orders

i.e. the Original SBPOs. "Syringa did not seek any appellate

review of [the] ruling that Syringa had failed to pursue an administrative challenge to the bid
awards. On appeal, Syringa did not challenge the award of the original SBPOs, and conceded
that the original SBPOs were lawful." (R., p. 1401 (Memorandum Decision and Order Re:
Motion to Reconsider).) "Now, Syringa seeks to argue that the original awards were an unlawful
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pretext to divide the scope of the work between Qwest and ENA. The doctrine of judicial
estoppel precludes Syringa from having it both ways." (R., p. 1402.)
The District Court also noted that it "entered a judgment in favor of ENA on the only
claim asserted against ENA in the original complaint, Count Six. This judgment has been
affirmed upon appeal. In the Court's view, ENA is no longer a party because there is no claim
against ENA in the original complaint which has not been fully resolved." (R., p. 1403.) Yet the
District Court held that "ENA must be made a party this action." (Id.) Although the District
Court concluded that "the affirmative claims against Qwest, Counts Four and Five," had been
dismissed as well, and this Court affirmed, the District Court concluded that "Qwest is still a
party to this action." (Id.)
Finally, the District Court opined on the impact of certain language from the Idaho
Supreme Court's decision in Syringa I:
In deciding that Syringa had standing to challenge the amended
SBPO to Qwest, the Supreme Court stated a principle of law that
was necessary to its decision, i.e. that by improperly splitting the
IEN RFP scope of work between ENA and Qwest, DOA caused a
distinct and palpable injury to Syringa .... The Court's
determination that the amendment violated state law is not dicta.
The Court's determination that the amendment violated state law is
the law of this case and will be adhered to by this Court.
(R., p. 1398.)
Syringa then filed a Second Amended Post-Appeal Complaint and a motion for summary
judgment, claiming that this Court's decision on the issue of standing meant Syringa was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law on the merits of Count Three without the development of any
factual record on the issue or trial. (See R., pp. 529-34 (Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment).) The DOA Opposed Syringa's Motion, DOA's Opposition
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asserting that (1) because neither ENA nor Qwest were included as parties to Count Three preappeal, the Idaho Supreme Court and the District Court lacked jurisdiction to make a ruling
adverse to either Qwest or ENA; (2) ENA should be dismissed from the Complaint, which would
necessitate dismissing the action; and (3) the mutual rescission of Amendments No. 1 to the
Original SBPOs 2 rendered Syringa' s claim moot and unripe. (R., pp. 1546-71 ).
Qwest joined in that opposition. (R., p. 1572-3.) Qwest also advised the District Court
of additional grounds for opposing Syringa's Motion: (a) that ENA was not a party to the action,
(b) Qwest had not yet answered, and (c) Qwest intended to assert various affirmative defenses in
its answer, including waiver, estoppel, and !aches. (R., p. 1573.)
On November 10, 2014, the District Court granted Syringa's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. (R., pp. 1638-53 (Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Pending Dispositive
Motions).) First, the District Court erroneously held that "all necessary parties have been joined
and the Court has jurisdiction." (R., p. 1646.) Second, the District Court ruled that, because
"[a]n agreement made in violation of the state's procurement law cannot be fixed or cured," the
Amendments No. 1 "dividing the scope of work render[ed] these awards void," despite the
District Court's earlier holding (R., p. 1401) that Syringa could not challenge the Original
SBPOs. (R., p. 1647.)
Next, the District Court addressed ENA' s argument sounding in res judicata and judicial

On July 15, 2014, the DOA and ENA executed Amendment No. 4, which rescinded
Amendment No. 1 to SBPO 1309. (R., p. 1457 (Affidavit of Bill Bums, Ex. A).) On July 30,
2014, the DOA and Qwest executed Amendment No. 4, which rescinded Amendment No. 1 to
SBPO 1308. (R., p. 1460 (Affidavit of Bill Bums, Ex. B)). Both Amendments made clear the
rescission was to "avoid any confusion or misperception concerning Amendment[s] No. l," and
that neither the DOA, ENA, nor Qwest, "intended Amendment[s] No. 1 to alter the services
available" from ENA or Qwest under the Original SBPOs.
2
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estoppel that Count Three could not be leveled against ENA: "ENA is correct that Syringa did
not challenge the award to ENA in its Complaint, and did not seek to add this claim until after
the appeal." (R., p. 1648.) The District Court nevertheless concluded that "ENA's arguments
correctly state the law, but, in the end, these arguments must be rejected." (Id.)
Finally, the District Court repeated its prior articulation of this Court's decision on
Syringa's standing to pursue Count Three of the Complaint, construing the standing decision as a
final adjudication on the merits of Syringa's Complaint and all possible defenses to it. (R., p.
1649.) As a result, the District Court held that "The Statewide Blanket Purchase Order to Qwest
(SBPO 1308), as amended by Amendment One, and the Statewide Blanket Purchase Order to
ENA (SBPO 1309), as amended by Amendment One, are void." (R., p. 1651.) The District
Court refused to allow the Defendants additional discovery or a trial on the merits. (R., p. 1649.)
Qwest and the other Defendants filed Motions for Clarification and/or Reconsideration of
the District Court's decision to grant Syringa's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R., pp.
1658-69, 1687-1705, 1712-38). In ruling on these motions, the District Court reiterated its
conclusion that this Court had given the District Court an absolute directive that Syringa must
prevail on the merits of Count Three. (See R., p. 2033 (Memorandum Decision and Order re:
Motions to Reconsider).) Indeed, the District Court held, "Should any clarification be needed,
the Court will find that because the original awards were part of the process DOA used to violate
procurement law, those original awards as amended are void." (Id.)
The District Court issued Judgment declaring both the Original SBPOs and the
Amendments No. 1 void on February 11, 2015. (R., p. 2038 (Judgment and I.R.C.P. 54(b)
Certificate).) Qwest filed a timely notice of appeal.
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

l.

Whether the District Court erred in granting Syringa's Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment under the erroneous conclusion that this Court's decision on the first appeal
established the law of the case not only with respect to standing and administrative exhaustion,
but also with respect to the merits of Count Three of the Complaint.
2.

Whether the District Court lacked jurisdiction under Idaho's Uniform Declaratory

Judgments Act because neither ENA nor Qwest were party to Count Three pre-appeal.
3.

Whether the DOA's rescission of Amendments No. I to SBPOs 1308 and 1309

rendered Syringa's sole claim moot.
4.

Whether the District Court erred in granting Syringa's Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment when it permitted Syringa to challenge the Original SBPOs, despite the
District Court's prior conclusion that Syringa was judicially estopped from doing so.
5.

Whether the District Court erred in voiding the entirety of the Qwest's contract

due to a perceived infirmity in the IEN portion, when the balance of the contract did not relate to
any Amendment No. 1.
6.

Whether the District Court erred in granting Syringa's Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment where Syringa was attempting to invalidate a contract under which it gained
a substantial financial benefit.
7.

Whether the District Court erred when it concluded that the Severability Clause in

the State of Idaho Standard Contract Terms and Conditions did not sever Amendment No. 1 from
SBPO 1308, particularly where the "Amendment" was unilaterally issued by DOA.
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III. ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review.

"On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court utilizes the
same standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on the motion." Safaris
Unlimited, LLC v. Von Jones, 353 P.3d 1080, 1084 (Idaho 2015) (internal quotations omitted).
Summary judgment is only proper "'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."' Id. (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c).
"All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party." Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585, 51 P.3d 396,399 (2002).
"When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same
standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being
reconsidered." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (Idaho 2012). Id. As a result, "when
reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for reconsideration following the grant of summary
judgment, this Court must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of material
fact to defeat summary judgment." Id.
B.

The District Court Erred in Holding that This Court's Standing Opinion in the First
Appeal Required a Ruling in Syringa's Favor on the Merits of its Reinstated Claim.

In Syringa I, the only issue before this Court with respect to Count Three of Syringa's
Complaint was whether Syringa had the right to pursue it. The merits had not been briefed or
decided below, and Syringa had never even filed a motion asking for a ruling on the claim in its
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favor as a matter of law. The parties instead focused on whether Syringa had standing to pursue
it, and if so, whether Syringa had failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Nevertheless, on remand the District Court erroneously held that this Court's decision
that Syringa had standing to pursue Count Three compelled the conclusion that Syringa was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the merits as well. That is incorrect.
The law of the case doctrine extends to "legal pronouncements and holdings necessary to
decide the particular issue presented. It is similar to the doctrine of stare decisis, which requires
that a statement of law be necessary to the ultimate disposition of the case in order to be binding
on the lower courts. Otherwise, the statement is considered to be dictum and not controlling."

Sun Valley Ranches v. Prairie Power Coop., 856 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993)
(internal citations omitted); see State v. Hawkins, 305 P.3d 513, 516-17 (Idaho 2013).
Because standing and administrative exhaustion are preliminary questions related to
subject matter jurisdiction, they are necessarily determined before reaching the merits of the
case. Wasden v. State Bd of Land Comm 'n, 280 P.3d 693,697 (Idaho 2012) ("Standing is a
preliminary question to be determined by this Court before reaching the merits of the case.")
(quoting Young v. City a/Ketchum, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (Idaho 2002)). As a result, when an
appellate court has before it only threshold jurisdictional matters such as standing, any
commentary on the merits is necessarily dicta. See United Steelworkers ofAmerica AFL-CIO-

CLC v. Johnson, 799 F.2d 402,404 (8th Cir. S.D. 1986).
For example, in United Steelworkers, the court considered the second of two cases
dealing with issues of benefit allocation to unemployed workers arising out of a labor dispute. In
the first case, the union had challenged the denial of food stamps to striking workers. The
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District Court in that case concluded that the union lacked standing to assert the claims but then
went on to discuss its views of the union's constitutional and preemption claims on the merits.
The court in United Steelworkers held, however, that "[b]ecause the case was decided upon the
Union's lack of standing, those views remain dicta and cannot be the law of that case, or this."

Id. at 404. The court therefore addressed the merits of those claims.
"The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the
party wishes to have adjudicated." Syringa I, 305 P.2d at 505 (quoting Miles v. Idaho Power
Co., 778 P.2d 757, 763 (Idaho 1989)). Indeed, the standing inquiry "in no way depends on the
merits" of a party's claim. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). It is instead a
threshold issue. Mueller v. Hill, 345 P .3d 998, 1002 (Idaho 2015) (quoting Bagley v. Thomason,
241 P.3d 979,981 (Idaho 2010)); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59,
72 ( 1978) ("[S]tanding focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes
to have adjudicated").
Moreover, an appellate court "does not consider an issue not passed upon below."
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); see also In re Estate of O'Brien, 262 P. 152, 153
(Idaho 1927) ("A court of last resort requires the record before it in order to take jurisdiction
because its action is limited by the scope of the record."); In re Estate of Mc Vay, 93 P. 28, 32
(Idaho 1908) ("It is axiomatic that a cause or an issue cannot be tried de nova that has never been
tried."). This principle derives from the Constitutional demarcation of appellate from original
jurisdiction. See IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 9; Mc Vay, 93 P. at 32 ("' Appellate jurisdiction' ... is the
direct antithesis of the words 'original jurisdiction"').
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Pursuant to these well-defined boundaries, this Court "is not a fact-finding court with
regard to its appellate jurisdiction." Stecklein v. Montgomery, 570 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Idaho 1977)
(Bistline, J. concurring); see also Western Heritage Ins. Co. v. Green, 54 P.3d 948, 951 (Idaho
2002) (noting the trial judge's "role as trier of fact" and that "[r]eview of the trial judge's
decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and whether
the findings of fact support the conclusions of law") (citing Conley v. Whittlesey, 985 P.2d 1127
(Idaho 1999)). "[ A]ppellate review is properly directed to ascertaining whether the findings
support the conclusions, and whether the evidence supports the findings." Stecklein, 570 P.2d at
1363 (Bistline, J. concurring). This is "essential in order that parties may have the opportunity
to offer all the evidence they believe relevant to the issues ... [and] in order that litigants may not
be surprised on appeal by final decision there of issues upon which they have had no opportunity
to introduce evidence." Singleton, 428 U.S. at 120 (quoting Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552,
556 (1941); see also Sun Valley Shamrock Res. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 794 P.2d 1389, 1391
(Idaho 1990) ("In an appellate review of a trial court decision we must always keep in mind the
respective roles assigned to the courts.").
As a result, "it is not proper for the court to consider the likelihood of success on the
merits in determining the plaintiff's standing to proceed." Hill v. Houston, 764 F.2d 1156, 11591160 (5th Cir. 1985). Indeed, an appellate court reviewing the standing issue is constrained to
accept as true all allegations in the complaint. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)
(superseded by statute on other grounds).
In Singleton, for example, a petitioner whose complaint challenging a statute as
unconstitutional was dismissed for lack of standing. The United States Court of Appeals for the
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Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the petitioner had standing, but the court of appeals also
proceeded "beyond the issue of standing to a resolution of the merits of the case." 428 U.S. at
119. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the ruling that the petitioner had standing but
reversed the appellate court's determination of the merits, holding that the Court of Appeals'
decision to proceed to the merits was "an unacceptable exercise of appellate jurisdiction." Id. at
119-120.
In this case, the District Court initially granted the DOA's motion for summary judgment
regarding Count Three on the threshold issue of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. As a
result, the merits of that Count were never briefed or argued to the District Court, or to this Court
in the first appeal, and the record is devoid of evidence regarding the merits. As of the first
appeal, the Defendants had no opportunity to present and argue evidence substantiating its
defenses to Count Three of Syringa' s Complaint, including evidence demonstrating that the
Amendments No. 1 were unilaterally issued by the DOA, evidence that the Original SBPOs were
have been the means by which numerous state agencies and school districts purchased services
from ENA and Qwest, and evidence that Syringa has accepted substantial benefits from the very
contracts it is attacking. 3 As a result, when Syringa appealed the Defendants presented no
record, argument, or briefing regarding the merits of the claim.
As in Singleton, because the matter was initially dismissed on a threshold jurisdictional
issue, the Defendants here have "never been heard in any way on the merits of the case" and

When it became clear that the District Court was poised to reach the merits of Count
Three on remand without developing the record, the Defendants did attempt to build a record on
these issues demonstrating the disputed issues of fact that render summary judgment in Syringa' s
favor inappropriate. (See, e.g., R., pp. 1318-19, 1113-24, 1457, 1460).
3
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were "justified in not presenting those arguments" to this Court, given the procedural posture of
the case. 428 U.S. at 120. As a result, this Court had "no idea what evidence, if any, [the
Defendants] would, or could, offer in defense of" the IEN award process because the Defendants
"ha[ve] had no opportunity to proffer such evidence." Id. The District Court's decision to
construe this Court's conclusion that Syringa had standing to pursue Count Three as a ruling on
the merits of Count Three was erroneous and must be reversed.

C.

The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction to Grant Syringa's Requested Relief.
"Lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time." Dept. of Health and

Welfare v. Housel, 90 P.3d 321, 326 (Idaho 2004). The District Court erred in concluding that it

had subject matter jurisdiction over this case when it ruled on the cross motions for summary
judgment. (See R., p. 1646.) Therefore, its decision granting Syringa's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment must be reversed.

1.

The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction Following Remand Due to the
Requirements of Idaho's Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.

The District Court dismissed the only claims in Syringa's pre-appeal Complaint that were
asserted against Qwest - Counts Four and Five

and this Court affirmed that dismissal in

Syringa I. The District Court also dismissed the only claim in Syringa's pre-appeal Complaint

asserted against ENA - Count Six - and this Court again affirmed. In summary, this Court
noted that "[ w ]e affirm the judgment dismissing all counts of the complaint except count three ..
. ." Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 512. Before the initial appeal addressed in Syringa I, Qwest and ENA

were not named as Defendants on Count Three of Syringa's Complaint.
On remand, "[a] trial court has no authority to enter any judgment or order not in
conformity with the order of the appellate court .... No modification of the judgment so
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directed can be made by the trial court, nor can any provision be ingrafted on or taken from it. ..
. Public interest requires that there shall be an end to litigation, and when a given cause has
received the consideration of a reviewing court, has had it merits determined, and has been
remanded with specific directions, the court to which such mandate is directed has no power to
do anything but to obey .... " Mountain Home Lumber Co. v. Swartwout, 33 Idaho at 740, 197
P. at 1028 (1921). In Syringa I, Qwest and ENA were dismissed and the case was remanded "for
further proceedings that are consistent with this opinion." Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 512. This
directive did not expand Count Three to include a challenge to the original awards, which
Syringa had expressly disclaimed. However, the District Court's unauthorized decision to grant
Syringa permission to amend its complaint on remand allowed such a challenge. Having
allowed Syringa to revise its theories after appeal, the District Court's decision resulted in a
ruling that is inconsistent with this Court's mandate.
Moreover, declaratory relief under Count Three could not be given to Syringa for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Idaho has adopted the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act
("UDJA"). Pursuant to section 10-1211 of the UDJA, "(w]hen declaratory relief is sought, all
persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest that would be affected by the
declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the
proceeding." This requirement has been interpreted as "set[ting] forth a jurisdictional

requirement." State ex rel. Dewberry v. Kulongoski, 210 P.3d 884, 891 (Or. 2009) (interpreting
Oregon's analog of section 10-1211) (emphasis added); see also e.g., Kendall v. Douglas, 820
P.2d 497, 502 (Wash. 1991) ("Appellants' failure to join the Counties as required by RCW
7.24.110 deprived the court of jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief."); Nat 'l Solid Wastes
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Mgmt. Ass 'n v. Stark-Tuscarawas-Wayne Joint Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist., 920 N.E.2d 978, 981
(Ohio 2009) ("The absence of a necessary party to a lawsuit is a jurisdictional defect that
precludes the court from rendering a declaratory judgment."); Dunn v. Daub, 611 N.W.2d 97,
100 (Neb. 2000) ("[T]he presence of necessary parties in declaratory judgment actions is
jurisdictional and cannot be waived, and if such persons are not made parties then the district
court has no jurisdiction to determine the controversy"); Stanley v. Mueller, 315 P.2d 125, 127
(Or. 1957) ("the courts have no authority to make a declaration unless all persons 'who have or
claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration' are parties to the proceeding.
Otherwise, there is no 'justiciable controversy' within the meaning of the statute."). Although
the Idaho appellate courts do not appear to have addressed whether section 10-1211 's
requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional, section 10-1215 of the UDJA mandates that the
act's provisions be interpreted "to make uniform" the law of the states that have enacted it.
As parties to the contracts that Syringa seeks to void, Qwest and ENA are necessary and
indispensable parties to the claims Syringa sought to add in Count Three. It is a "fundamental
principle" that "a party to a contract is necessary, and if not susceptible to joinder, indispensable
to litigation seeking to decimate that contract." Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric.
Improvement & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Lomayaktewa v.
Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1975) ("[N]o procedural principle is more deeply
imbedded in the common law than that, in an action to set aside a lease or a contract, all parties
who may be affected by the determination of the action are indispensable"); Weiss bard v. Potter
Drug & Chem. Corp., 69 A.2d 559, 561 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1949), aff'd 17 A.2d 629 (stating that
"[a] contract may not be declared null and void in the absence of a party to the contract"); Wright
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v. Nashville Gas & Heating Co., 194 S.W.2d 459,461 (Tenn. 1946) ("The non-joinder of
necessary parties is fatal on the question of 'justiciability' which, in a suit for a declaratory
judgment, is a necessary condition of judicial relief."); Louisville v. Louisville Auto. Club, Inc.,
290 Ky. 241, 250, 160 S. W.2d 663, 668 (I 942) ("Persons whose interests are affected by
declarations must be made parties.").
When this Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the District Court's
decisions on the various motions for summary judgment filed by the Defendants in this case, the
only surviving claim was Count Three of Syringa's Complaint, which sought a declaratory
judgment against the DOA regarding the invalidity of the Amendment No. 1 to SBPO 1308 to
Qwest. All claims against ENA had been summarily dismissed, which dismissal was affirmed on
appeal. (See also R., p. 1403 (Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Reconsider) ("In
the Court's view, ENA is no longer a party because there is no claim against ENA in the original
complaint which has not been fully resolved.").) Further, although this Court allowed Syringa
standing to "challenge the amended contract to Qwest," Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 506, the two
claims asserted against Qwest had also been dismissed.
Under res judicata principles, a defendant in a previous action is protected from having
the plaintiff bring another claim against it that arises out of the transaction underlying the
previous suit. Grub/er v. Brydon, 125 Idaho 107,110,867 P.2d 981,984 (1994). Resjudicata,
also known as claim preclusion, is a principle of substantive law that holds that a party, absent
fraud, is not allowed two tries at the same claim. See Walters v. Industrial lndem. Co. of Idaho,
949 P.2d 223, 224-5 (Idaho 1997). In particular, after one judgment on a claim, preclusion bars
the attempt to "raise a new legal theory to seek a remedy for acts arising out of [the same]
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transaction." See Walters, 949 P.2d at 838. The principle extends not only to "every matter
offered and received to sustain or defeat" a claim, but also to "every matter which might and
should have been" previously litigated. Farmers Nat. Bankv. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 70,878 P.2d
762, 769 (1994). In short, "[u]nder the principles of claim preclusion, a valid final judgment
rendered on the merits ... is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties
upon the same claim." Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). A claim
will be precluded if it could have been brought in the previous action, "where: ( 1) the original
action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the same parties as
the original action, and (3) the present claim arises out of the same transaction or series of
transactions as the original action." Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 278 P.3d 943, 951
(Idaho 2012). All of these elements are met here.
Syringa failed to name Qwest and ENA as defendants in Count Three of the Complaint,
and all of the claims asserted against Qwest and ENA had been dismissed, with that dismissal
affirmed on appeal. No additional claims could be brought against Qwest and ENA on remand.
As a result, the District Court had no jurisdiction to grant Syringa any relief prejudicial to Qwest
or ENA as parties to the relevant contracts. Therefore, the District Court's grant of summary
judgment to Syringa must be reversed.
2.

The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction Following the Rescission of the
Amendments No. l.

The District Court also lacked subject matter jurisdiction at the time it granted Syringa's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, because the Amendments No. 1 to the Original SBPOs
had been rescinded before its decision. Pursuant to Idaho's UDJA, LC. §10-1202, "[a]ny person
interested under a ... written contract ... , or whose rights, status or other relations are affected by
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a statute[or] contract ... , may have determined any question of construction or validity arising
under the ... statute [or] contract ... and obtain a declaration ofrights, status or other legal
relations thereunder." However, a court's jurisdiction under section 10-1202 is limited to cases
"where an actual or justiciable controversy exists," and courts cannot "decid[ e] cases which are
purely hypothetical or advisory." Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation District, 297 P.3d 1134,
1143 (Idaho 2013) (quoting Wylie v. Idaho Transp. Bd., 253 P.3d 700, 705 (Idaho 2011)).
Therefore, "an action for declaratory judgment is moot where the judgment, if granted,
would have no effect either directly or collaterally on the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be unable
to obtain further relief based on the judgment and no other relief is sought in the action." Id.
(quoting Wylie, 253 P.3d at 706). Whether an issue is moot is to be determined at the time of the
court's trial or hearing. Id.
"When conduct sought to be redressed by either declaratory or injunctive relief if peculiar
to a particular event that has already occurred, the finality of the event in a manner incapable of
repetition moots the controversy." See Zingiber Inv., LLC v. Hagerman Highway Dist., 249 P.3d
868,878 (Idaho 2011) (quoting 22 A. Am. Jur.2d Declaratory Judgments §36(2003)); see also

Euclid Ave. Trust v. City of Boise, 193 P.3d 853, 857 (Idaho 2008) ("A case is moot if it presents
no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have no practical effect upon the
outcome."). In Zingiber, this Court held that the matter was moot because: "The permit issued
by the District authorized Lyn Clif to construct a pipe. That pipe has already been constructed.
Avoiding the permit would not provide Zingiber the relief it requests." Id.
Here, the Defendants mutually rescinded the Amendments No. 1 to the Original SBPOs
because the Defendants did not deem them relevant to how work was being allocated under the
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SBPOs. (R., pp. 1457-60.) Mootness principles require that the plaintiffs alleged injury
continue throughout the litigation. As a result, even if a plaintiff can demonstrate the requisite
"distinct palpable injury" at the commencement of the litigation, when the circumstances change
during the pendency of the litigation such that the injury no longer exists, the case becomes moot
and is properly dismissed by the court. See id; Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520
U.S. 43, 67 (1997); Dorman v. Young, 332 P.2d 480,481 (Idaho 1958) ("[W]hen, pending an
appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and without any fault of the defendant, an event
occurs which renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff,
to grant him any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but
will dismiss the appeal") (quoting Coburn v. Thornton, 164 P. 1012, 1014-15 (Idaho 1917)).
Count Three of Syringa's Second Amended Post Appeal Complaint sought to void the
February 26, 2009, Amendments No. I. Therefore, after the rescission of the Amendments
No. 1, there was no longer an issue to be decided under Count Three at the time the District
Court granted Syringa's motion. As a result, the District Court did not have jurisdiction to grant
the reliefrequested by Syringa, and the District Court's judgment must be reversed.
D.

The District Court Erred in Granting Syringa's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.
1.

The District Court Erred in Invalidating the Original SBPOs.

In granting Syringa's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the District Court also erred
in holding that the underlying SBPOs 1308 and 1309 were void in addition to the challenged
Amendments No. 1. This holding is directly contrary to the law of the case established by this
Court and the District Court and contract law principles addressing the impact of a void or
rescinded amendment on the underlying contract.
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a)

The District Court Erred by Failing to Bar Syringa From Challenging
the Original SBPOs.

When Syringa filed suit five years ago, it did not allege any claim challenging the award
to ENA of the original SBPO 1309 or its unilateral amendment. (See R., p. 1397.) Indeed,
Syringa intentionally pursued theory that would have preserved the original awards and declared
only the Qwest "amendment" invalid, essentially alleging that the connectivity services awarded
to Qwest should have been awarded to Syringa under the IEN Alliance Proposal. (See id.) The
law of the case and judicial estoppel now preclude Syringa from directly challenging the original
SBPOs. Nevertheless, the District Court allowed Syringa to achieve that relief, although Syringa
had expressly disclaimed any attempt to obtain it.
On July 23, 2010, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order that
granted summary judgment to the State Defendants on the requests for declaratory relief as
alleged in Count Three of the complaint, because Syringa failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies. While disputing the District Court's conclusion with respect to
Amendment No. 1, in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration Syringa
"acknowledge[d] that the administrative appeal requirements ofldaho Code§ 67-5733 apply to
bid specification challenges and to award challenges," and agreed with the District Court that it
had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies with respect to the original SBPOs.
On appeal to this Court, Syringa's opening brief framed the issue on appeal as follows:
Did the district court err in holding, as a matter of law, that Syringa
was barred, by failure to exhaust administrative remedies set out in
Idaho Code§ 67-5377(1)(c), from challenging the legality ofpostaward amendments to Statewide Blanket Purchase Orders issued
to prime contractors ENA and Qwest that violated Idaho Code
§ 67-571 SA ... ?
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Plaintiff/Appellant's Opening Br. (First Appeal) at 28 (emphasis added). Syringa repeatedly
reiterated that it was not challenging the original SBPOs:

Both SPBOs complied with Idaho Code§ 67-5718A because they
were issued for the entire IEN Project, could accommodate
"vertical" end-to end solutions, and were for the "same or similar"
property .... The original SBPOs allowed competition as
contemplated by I.C. § 67-5718A.
Plaintiff/Appellant's Opening Br. at 16 (emphasis added).
Syringa does not challenge the Letter of Intent or the identical and
lawful SBPOs issued to Qwest and ENA on January 28, 2009
because they did not split the IEN Project.
Plaintiff/Appellant's Reply Br. (First Appeal) at 8 (emphasis added).
As a result, this Court specifically noted that "[ o]n appeal, Syringa does not challenge the
multiple award." Syringa I, 305 P.3d at 504. This Court also noted that "[t]he initial contracts to
ENA and Qwest on January 28, 2009, constituted an award to two bidders to furnish the same or
similar property. The material provisions of their contracts were identical. There was no
differentiation as to the scope of work each was to perform under their respective contracts." Id.
Consistent with this history, on remand the District Court rejected Syringa's attempt to
challenge the original SBPOs in its First Amended Post Appeal Complaint. First, the District
Court found that "Syringa conceded the correctness of the Court's determination that Syringa
had ... failed to exhaust an administrative remedy to challenge ... the award of the SBPO to
Qwest." (R., p. 1400.) Second, the District Court found that "[ o ]n appeal, Syringa did not
challenge the award of the original SBPOs, and conceded that the original SBPOs were lawful."
(R., p. 1401.) "Rather, Syringa focused the appeal on the challenge to the amendments which
divided the scope of work between Qwest and ENA." (Id.) Therefore, the District Court
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determined that "[t]he doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes Syringa from having it both ways.
Because Syringa has previously conceded that the original SBPOs were lawful, Syringa will be
estopped from taking the opposite position now." (R., p. 1402.)
The law of the case is clear: (1) Syringa may not challenge the lawful original SBPOs;
(2) Syringa does not have standing to challenge the lawful original SBPOs; and (3) Syringa
failed to exhaust available administrative remedies with respect to the original SBPOs. Yet, the
District Court granted Syringa's motion for summary judgment declared void both the
Amendments No. I and the Original SBPOs. See R., p. 2033. Judicial estoppel, also known as
the doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent positions, "precludes a party from gaining an advantage
by taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position."
Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d 492, 502 (2004)

In its First Amended Post-Appeal Complaint, Syringa sought to challenge both the
January 28, 2009 and the February 26, 2009 IEN Amended Purchase Orders, and the District
Court rejected its attempt. Count Three of Syringa's Second Amended Post-Appeal Complaint,
by contrast, sought invalidation of the "February 26, 2009 IEN Amended Purchase Orders to
ENA and Qwest." (R., p. 1423.) By disallowing this expansive amendment on the basis of
judicial estoppel, the District Court limited the relief Syringa could obtain under its Complaint only the February 26, 2009 Amendments were open to challenge.
By later holding otherwise, the District Court violated the law of the case it and this
Court had clearly established with respect to judicial estoppel and the Original SBPOs.
Therefore, the District Court's grant of summary judgment to Syringa must be reversed.
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b)

A Void or Rescinded Amendment Returns the Parties to the
Underlying Contract Prior to Its Amendment.

Even if the Amendments No. I are void this conclusion does not tarnish the otherwise
lawful underlying Original SBPOs. This Court has held that void "contracts are deemed never to
have existed in the eyes of the law." S. Idaho Realty-Century 2 I v. Larry J Hell hake & Assocs.,
636 P.2d 168, 173 (Idaho 1981 ). This principle applies to contract amendments, which may be
void but do not affect the underlying original agreement.
For example, Knowlton v. Mudd, 775 P.2d 154 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989), a woman sold a
piece of real property to her son. Id. at 15 5. After five years, the son stopped paying his mother
on the loan. Id. Meanwhile, the mother became mentally and physically debilitated. Id. When
the woman's daughter was appointed conservator of her mother's estate, the son presented his
mother with an amendment to contract that would reduce the balance of the loan, forgive unpaid
interest, reduce the loan's interest rate, and lengthen the loan term. Id. The Idaho Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision that the amendment to the contract was void, because
the mother was incapacitated when she signed it. Id. at 156. The Court did not hold that the
amendment nullified the entire contract. Id.
Thus, whether the Amendments No. 1 are rescinded or void, they are deemed nonexistent, and what remains are the original SBPOs, which the District Court has held cannot be
challenged as unlawful. See R., p. 140 I. This position is consistent with many other states' law.
See, e.g., Empire gas Inc. ofArdmore v. Hardy, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3167 at *7 (Tenn. Ct.

App. February 27, 1987) ('"[I]fthe substituted contract is voidable, it discharges the original
duty until avoidance, but [on] avoidance of the substituted contract the original duty is again
enforceable."') (quoting Rest. 2d Contracts§ 279 cmt. b (1979)); id. ("'[T]he avoided contract is
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nullified both as an executory contract and as a discharge. The prior claim then becomes
enforceable."') (quoting Corbin, Corbin on Contracts§ 1293, at 196 (1962)); Blake v. Buck, 587
P.2d 575,577 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) ("A void contract cannot legally modify or extinguish an
earlier valid contract, thus the original agreement remains in effect and can be sued upon.")
(citing 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interest & Usury§ 247 (1969)); Shinn v. Edwin Yee, LTD., 553 P.2d 733,
745 (Hawaii 1976) (A "void and unenforceable" agreement to modify an original contract "could
have no effect and the original contract must stand."); Spellman v. Ruhde, 137 N.W.2d 425,428
(Wis. 1965) ("The trial court properly concluded that the 1963 agreement must be considered
viable upon the demise of the 1964 agreement."); Tillman v. Talbert, 93 S.E.2d 101 (N.C. 1956)
("A subsequent illegal agreement by the parties cannot affect a previous fair and lawful contract
between them in relation to the same subject. The change is regarded as a mere nullity, and as
such cannot scathe the original contract."); Fer kin v. Bd of Educ., 15 N.E. 2d 799, 800 (N.Y.
1938) (Because "original agreements were supported by consideration and [were] not dependent
upon the new agreement for support," the fact that the new agreement was an "illegal contract"
could not "nullify[] the previous legal contract."); McCurdy v. Dillon, 98 N.W. 746, 748 (Mich.
1904) ("If a valid contract for retainer fees was in fact made, it would not be abrogated because
an attempt was made to merge it in a void contract.").
Further, this Court's decision in Syringa I supports this conclusion. There, this Court
held, inter alia, that (1) Syringa was not challenging the original SBPOs, 305 P.3d at 504,
(2) Syringa had "standing to challenge the amended contract to Qwest," id at 506, and (3)
Syringa did not have any "administrative remedy to challenge the amendment to ENA's
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[Qwest's][sic] contract," id. The only way to consistently read this decision is to conclude that
Syringa may challenge the Amendments No. 1, but not the original SBPOs.
Where the validity of the original SBPOs is established, the voiding of the Amendments
No. 1 cannot "infect with invalidity" the original SBPOs. See In re Hellwig's Estate, 34 N.Y.S.
2d at 877. Rather, "the original [SBPOs] must stand." Shinn, 553 P.2d at 745. As a result, the
District Court erred in concluding that Syringa's claim in Count Three against the DOA required
invalidating both the Amendments No. 1 and the Original SBPOs.

c)

The District Court Erred in Voiding the Entirety of the Contracts Due
to a Perceived Infirmity in the IEN Portion

The Idaho Division of Purchasing issued SBPOs 1308 and 1309 to Qwest and ENA on
January 28, 2009. (R., pp. 1120-21.) SBPO 1308 and SBPO 1309 are substantively identical
awards authorizing the State to select any service from either of its vendors. (Id.) These SBPOs
relate to services made available to two separate categories of customers: (i) state agencies, and
(ii) schools participating in the IEN. (R., pp. 1119-21.) The Amendments No. 1, however, relate
to the IEN only, and not to state agencies. (R., pp. 1137-40.) Thus, even if the original SBPOs
were somehow tainted by the Amendments No. 1, that taint would only extend to the IEN
portion of the contracts and cannot affect the state agency portion of the award, which at all
times has been governed solely by the original SBPOs. (See R., pp. 1124-25.)
On February 26, 2009, the DOA issued Amendments No. 1 to SBPO 1308 and SBPO
1309, which were issued to clarify the State's intended roles and responsibilities for the
implementation of certain phases of the IEN. (See R., pp. 1122-23.) These Amendments did not
relate to state agency networks, which are a separate component of the RFP from the IEN, and
which was not affected by the Amendments. Amendment No. 1 to SBPO 1308 provides:
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I. Qwest will be the general contractor for all IEN technical network
services. The Service Provider listed on the State's Federal E-Rate Form
471, Education Networks of America (ENA) is required to work with the
dedicated Qwest Account Team for ordering, and provisioning of, ongoing maintenance, operations and billing for all IEN sites.
(R., p. 1137.) Amendment No. 1 to SBPO 1309 similarly provides:
1. ENA will be the Service Provider listed on the State's Federal E-Rate
Form 471. Qwest Communications Company LLC ("Qwest") is required
to work with the ENA Account Team for ordering, and provisioning of,
on-going maintenance, operations and billing for all IEN sites.

(R., p. 1139.) Neither Amendment No. 1 references state agency sites, coordination regarding
non-lEN sites, or any division of responsibility for such locations. (R., pp. 1137-40.) All
references are to the IEN. (Id.)
As discussed previously, the District Court held that Syringa could not challenge the
lawfulness of the Original SBPOs. Nevertheless, the District Court held that the SBPOs, as
amended, are void because the amendments divided the scope of work, and declared the awards
to be void regardless of whether that work was done for the IEN project.
But the original SBPOs relate both to the IEN and to separate state agency networks.
These state agency services were never challenged by Syringa, were never part of this case, and
they are not addressed in the challenged Amendments No. 1, which address only the IEN. The
state agency work was never divided. Moreover, Syringa did not challenge the original SBPOs;
its challenge has been limited to the IEN and the Amendments No. 1.
The Original SBPOs were lawful at their execution, and they have been the basis for the
purchase of technical services by numerous state agencies independent of the Amendments
No. 1. (R., p. 1124 (Affidavit of Greg Zickau ,r,r 41-46); R., pp. 1196-97 (Affidavit of Joel
Strickler ,r,r 3-8)). As a result, there is no basis for holding that Original SBPOs were tainted by
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the Amendments No. 1, or that any impact from the Amendments No. I, would expend to nonIEN work. The District Court's grant of summary judgment must be reversed, at a minimum, to
the extent that it voids Qwest's agreement for state agency network services.
2.

The District Court Erred in Permitting Syringa to Challenge a Contract
under which It Gained a Substantial Financial Benefit.

The District Court further erred in granting summary judgment to Syringa on Count
Three of the Complaint because Syringa is estopped from challenging either the Original SBPOs
or the Amendments No. 1 because it chose to contract with Qwest to work on the IEN Project
and accepted the benefits of the contracts it now claims are void. Having chosen to work on the
IEN Project, Syringa forfeited any right to challenge the IEN contracts.
Whether framed as waiver or estoppel, "a party generally cannot accept a benefit from a
procedure or action and then claim that the procedure or act is invalid." Thomas v. Med. Ctr.
Physicians, P.A., 61 P.3d 557,563 (Idaho 2002) (citing Johnson v. Pischke, 700 P.2d 19, 23
(Idaho 1985) ). Indeed, this Court stated over 100 years ago that the rule that a party who has
received the benefits of a contract is estopped from challenging the validity of such contract is
"so well established, and is consonant with every principle of equity and common honesty, that it
needs no citation of authority to support it." Fremont Cnty. v. Warner, 63 P. 106, 107 (Idaho
1900) (holding that party who had benefited from the contract was "estopped from setting up the
defense of ultra vires"); see also Payette Lakes Protective Ass 'n v. Lake Reservoir Co., 189 P.2d
I 009, 1016 (Idaho 1948) (rejecting appellant's argument that contract is "void as against public
policy" and holding that appellant, "having accepted the fruits," was "estopped to set up any
claim of ultra vires or invalidity of the contract"); Moore v. Boise Land & Orchard Co., I 73 P.
117, 117 (Idaho 1918) (appellant "is estopped from asserting that the encumbrances are void").
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On April 24, 2011, shortly after filing its Notice of Appeal in the first appeal in this case,
Syringa executed a Master Services Agreement with Qwest for the express purpose of providing
services needed for the IEN. (R., pp. 1319-40 (Affidavit of Elissa Homenock, ,i,i 3-6, Exh. A)).
From 2011-13, Qwest purchased and paid for services from Syringa under the MSA for purposes
of the IEN, for a total of$1,435,367. (R., p. 1319, ,i 7.) Qwest continued to purchase and utilize
services from Syringa for the IEN beyond 2013. (Id.)
Because Syringa chose to accept the benefits of the IEN contracts, including all
subsequent amendments, it has waived any right to challenge those contracts or amendments,
and is estopped from bringing its claims under Count Three. Syringa "cannot accept a benefit"
from the IEN contract and then "claim that the [contracts are] invalid." Thomas, 61 P.3d at 563.
As a result, the District Court's grant of summary judgment to Syringa notwithstanding its
cognizance of the foregoing is reversible error.

3.

The District Court Erred in Failing to Give Effect to the Severability Clause
Incorporated into the Original SBPOs 1308 and 1309.

In denying Syringa's Motion for Reconsideration, the District Court erred by failing to
give effect to the severability clauses incorporated into the Original SBPOs. "Whether a contract
is entire or severable depends on the intention of the parties which is to be ascertained and
determined, when the contract is unambiguous, from the subject matter of the agreement and the
language used therein, taking the agreement as a whole and not its separate parts without regard
to one another."' Magic Valley Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Prof Business Servs., Inc., 808 P.2d
1303, 1312 (Idaho 1991) (quoting 1'-1organ v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 201 P.2d 976, 979
(Idaho 1948)).
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Under the plain language of standard terms and conditions incorporated into the Original
SBPOs, the Amendments No. I, if invalid, must be severed from the original and lawful SBPOs.
This severability clause states that "In the event any term of the Contract is held to be invalid or
unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remaining terms of the Contract will
remain in force." (R., p. 1683 (Affidavit of Steven F. Schossberger, Ex. I).)
The District Court refused to give effect to the severability clause, concluding that such a
provision cannot supplant Idaho law. (R., p. 2034.) However, that is not what such a clause
does. Instead, a severability clause is designed to preserve an otherwise lawful contract from the
presence of a term that is later held to be invalid. Thus, applying a severability clause does not
vindicate the illegality in the severed term; it preserves an otherwise lawful and enforceable
agreement by eliminating any offending terms. The District Court should have found that the
Original SBPOs, which it had previously held to be valid, could be stripped of whatever taint it
construed the Amendments No. I imposed. In failing to even consider the impact of the
severability clause on the Amendments No. I, the District Court erred.
IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Qwest respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District
Court's award of summary judgment to Syringa, and declare that the original SBPOs constitute
lawful and valid contracts.
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